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By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
The Brexit vote proved a profound shock to the political system, with “Remainers” and “Leavers” 
alike expecting a ‘Remain’ victory[1]. Although initial research focussed on the so-called “left 
behind”[2], it quickly became clear that focussing solely on the characteristics of individuals was 
missing an important element. 
In particular, one of the many things that became quite clear was that there were obvious regional 
differences in the vote[3]. This is the case even at an extremely local level where local areas voted 
similarly even after controlling for demographic factors[4]. 
It’s no surprise, therefore, to find that regional issues – long ignored by the UK’s body politic – have 
suddenly found themselves propelled up the political agenda. The largely rhetorical “northern 
powerhouse” gave way first to an “industrial strategy” and now to a “levelling up” agenda that is 
likely to be at least somewhat more concrete (if only for reasons of political expediency). 
It was in this vein that on Monday, I had the pleasure to watch this fascinating talk on the likely 
regional issues raised by the current pandemic. Yet whilst many of us consider it axiomatic that 
regional issues should matter, this is by no means universal. There remains an active debate over 
whether policies should be ‘place neutral’[5] or ‘place based’[6]. 
It is therefore worth considering precisely why regional differences matter, as it has profound 
consequences for scholarship and practice alike. In particular, I contend that it is the presence of 
imperfect mobility that (almost exclusively) drives the need for the study of regional issues. 
Naturally, this is also true at the supranational level: if individuals were perfectly mobile then it 
would be of little relevance that Somalia is poorer than Sweden. 
In the real world, at the supranational level barriers to mobility (legal, linguistic, cultural etc.) are 
formidably high. Whilst lower than this, the barriers to interregional mobility also remain quite 
profound – a fact that can be all too often ignored in economic modelling and by policymakers. 
Take the example of childcare. For many families the cost of this (for infants) can approach or 
exceed their income from a job. The presence of family members able to give informal care (typically 
grandparents) can therefore be worth thousands of pounds. That’s a major barrier to labour 
mobility. 
For those with school-age children, the barriers are different but no less significant. Reticence over 
moving schools is natural, doubly so if children are approaching exams (for which different schools 
often study different syllabi). At the other end of the spectrum, many adults have caring 
responsibilities for elderly relatives. 
Moreover, most working adults have specific labour market ties in a certain area and changing 
employers is not costless in terms of redundancy rights. This is before we begin to touch on 
questions of culture and non-pecuniary incentives to live (and work) in a certain region. This can be 
especially true for those with migrant backgrounds where there are issues of religion (where can I 
worship nearby?), ethnicity (fear of racism or ostracism from a new community) and language 
(especially prevalent for some older family members). 
Ultimately, uprooting one’s family from a community is hardly welfare neutral and, as a result, place 
matters. What is less clear is how we should best understand and address these differences between 
places. Returning to our opening theme – how does this impact the political unhappiness that has 
been variously termed “the geography of discontent”[7], the “revenge of places that don’t 
matter”[8] and those regions that have been “left behind”? 
Is this a reaction to differences in regional living standards – in which case existing measures are 
clearly only capturing part of the issue. One measure widely used at a national level is GDP per 
capita – the amount of economic output produced per person, valued at market rates – where it is 
used as a proxy for all sorts of things, not least living standards. When applied on a regional level, 
however, things are much less clear cut for myriad reasons. 
Where nationally, GDP typically (but not always – see Ireland and Luxembourg for counterexamples) 
accords quite closely with gross national income, for regions the association is much weaker[9, 10]. 
Another important question is how we treat prices, which has important and wide-ranging 
ramifications. 
Commuting is an obvious distortion, but there are also life-cycle issues at play (as well as more 
general demographic issues). More broadly, we know that non-wage incomes differ dramatically 
from place to place, but is this a regional problem per se? After all, there is nothing to stop someone 
in the North East purchasing shares in a company that generates most of its value added in London 
and thereby getting the benefit of any profits. 
What of differing consumption patterns between regions and questions of fairness in the allocation 
of non-market resources? We know that there are large differences in the provision of non-market 
resources and that these are remarkably persistent over time[11]. 
Perhaps, however, at issue is not so much direct differences in wage incomes and consumption as 
much as differences in access to opportunity. Most individuals develop a skill set that is unique – or 
at least most valuable – to certain industries. 
When individuals are not easily mobile, they are vulnerable to local industrial change. The 
ramifications might be unemployment, but they might also be a movement from a relatively affluent 
part of the labour force to one in which work is less skilled, lower paid and more precarious. These 
are the places in which we should look in order to understand the “electric shock” that the political 
establishment received in 2016. 
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